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1. Summary  
Governments and political parties with an armed history are not unusual, yet how these groups 
function during and after the transition from conflict has largely been ignored by the existing 
literature. Many former armed groups have assumed power in a variety of contexts. Whilst this 
process is often associated with brokered peace agreements that encourage former combatants 
to transform into political parties, mobilise voters, and ultimately stand for elections, this is not 
always the case. What is less clearly understood is how war termination by insurgent victory 
shapes patterns of post-war politics. This rapid literature review collates available evidence of 
transitions made by armed groups to government. The literature collated presents a mixed 
picture, with transitions mediated by an array of contextual factors that are location and group 
specific. Case studies are drawn from a range of contexts where armed groups have assumed 
some influence over government (these include those via negotiated settlement, victory and in 
contexts of ongoing protracted conflict). The review provides a series of readings and case 
studies that are of use in understanding how armed groups may transition in “post-conflict” 
settings. Case studies are drawn from a range of contexts including Uganda, Ethiopia, Libya, 
Burundi, East Timor, Aceh, Colombia, Palestine, Lebanon, Mozambique, Angola and Rwanda. 
The evidence suggests that in tracking how political legacies established during wartime can 
affect armed groups’ approaches to politics after war, it is important to understand the multi-
layered relationships these actors establish during conflict. A successful insurgent armed group 
is simultaneously a political party, military organisation, and a business organisation, and this 
‘triple feature’ is essential to understanding protracted armed conflict as well as transitions in the 
‘post-conflict’ period. Commentators have asserted that the politics of war time (sometimes 
referred to as ‘rebel politics’) must address the same sets of challenges as more traditional forms 
of governance, except in a context where violence and predation are rewarded and consequently 
more pronounced. 
A challenge identified in the literature is to identify the factors that explain how ex-combatants 
decide to mobilise and organise and how, when in a position to govern, they decide to relate to 
their former members. Moving beyond the instrumentalist notion of describing ex-combatants 
role in the governance of post-conflict societies, the relationship is not straightforward. As several 
studies show, demobilisation can be a complex process, as ex-combatants have high 
expectations of what their sacrifice and subsequent contribution to peace either via a settlement 
or victory will bring in the forms of rewards, elevated status and economic compensation. What is 
clear from the growing literature in this field is that both the legacies of armed group mobilisation 
as well as the nature of conflict endings (settlement versus victory) impact the transition process. 
Interlinked and crosscutting factors that influence transition may include: 
 Origins of the combatants: The origins of political actors, often deeply affects their 
organisation, political culture, strategic behaviour and democratic capacity and 
participation in the (electoral) political game.  
 Experience of administration: Insurgent groups engaged in protracted civil war often 
have direct experience administering liberated territory. When this is the case they may 
be more able to govern than others who lack this experience. 
 Interdependency between elites, combatants and civilian support networks: 
Wartime mobilisation can create strong and lasting ties of inter-dependency between 
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leadership elites of the rebel group and ex-combatants and their civilian support networks 
– these interdependencies can both support and hinder transitions.  
 Strength of networks of (former combatants): Similarly, another area of concern is the 
strength of networks of former combatants. Peacebuilding and reintegration policies often 
try to break such networks and disconnect individuals from each other. How important 
these networks are for the functioning of these groups in post-conflict settings requires 
further investigation. 
 Wartime legacies: An important factor shaping the rebel-to-political transition of armed 
movements in post-conflict settings pertains to the political identity these groups develop 
in wartime. This political identity is itself a multi-dimensional concept shaped not only by 
the political ideology, practices and institutions established by the rebel organisation, but 
also by the relationship with the state and its political institutions.  
 Nature of war termination: The existing literature on the links between different types of 
war termination and post-war politics has inconsistent findings. Some authors suggest 
victory can lead to democratisation, others challenge this finding. 
 Initial legitimacy from victory: Victorious rebels are more likely to derive legitimacy 
from defeating the old order and ending the violence. 
 Power consolidation rather than power-sharing: victorious insurgents often focus on 
consolidating and expanding their political power, incorporating new constituencies, and 
building upon their pre-existing wartime structures of command and control. 
2. Armed Groups Post-Conflict Transitions 
Governments and political parties with an armed history are not unusual, yet how these groups 
function during and after the transition from conflict has largely been ignored in the existent 
literature (Sindre & Söderström, 2016). Sindre and Söderström (2016) continue that in recent 
decades, many former armed groups have assumed power in a variety of contexts. Whilst this 
process is often associated with brokered peace agreements that encourage former combatants 
to transform into political parties, mobilise voters, and ultimately stand for elections, this is not 
always the case. What is less clearly understood is how war termination by insurgent victory 
shapes patterns of post-war politics. While the percentage of civil wars that end in negotiations 
grew dramatically after the end of the Cold War, overall in the period between 1940-2000, a 
significant percentage (40%) still ended in victory (Toft, 2010: 6). In turn, Söderberg, Kovacs and 
Svensson (2012) argue that armed conflicts are increasingly ending in situations where rebels 
are labelled as terrorists with whom negotiations are presumed to be impossible. Questions that 
emerge from the literature regarding non-state actors and their role in post-conflict governance 
include (Lyons 2016a; 2016; Sindre & Söderström; 2016): 
 Does the culture of non-state armed groups change over time?  
 What allows or determines whether parties to conflict break patterns of behaviour that 
delivered victory and adopt more democratic internal workings or not?  
 Does the nature of the conflict matter (Lyons 2016)?  
 Does the nature of conflict-ending matter (Lyons 2016a)?  
 Do insurgent victories produce less inclusive and more authoritarian governance 
mechanisms than those emerging from negotiated settlements? 
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 What influence does the foundational ideology or political aspirations of armed 
movements have on transitions? 
Armed groups are thus not only the central protagonists of contemporary war-making; but they 
are also increasingly shaping both wartime and peacetime political orders (Harbom et al. 2006).  
In tracking how wartime political legacies during conflict can affect armed groups’ approaches to 
politics after war, it is important to understand the multi-layered relationships established during 
conflict with the state and its political institutions. As Staniland (2012) comments, the relationship 
between an armed group and the government of the state from which they operate can vary from 
one of open conflict and confrontation, to one of sporadic clashes and latent conflict, to de facto 
détente and forced yet separate co-existence, to fully fledged cooperation or mutual dependence 
or shared sovereignty (with or without conflict) (Staniland, 2012).  
Adding further complexity, analysing the state-rebel political interactions requires a better 
understanding of the dense network of relations these groups establish with their environment in 
providing social services and governance. Unsurprisingly, these governance networks can have 
an impact on the armed group’s role and status both in wartime as well as in a post-conflict 
setting (Börzel, 2010). 
Elaborating on this point, Collier et al. (2003), have noted that a successful insurgent armed 
group is simultaneously a political party, military organisation, and a business organisation and 
that this ‘triple feature’ is essential to understanding protracted armed conflict (Collier et al., 2003: 
56). Numerous authors have asserted that the politics of war time (sometimes referred to as 
‘rebel politics’) must address the same sets of challenges as more traditional forms of 
governance, except in a context where violence and predation are rewarded and consequently 
more pronounced. In this formulation, civil war is a form of contentious politics that requires a 
particular type of organisation, the insurgent group (Collier et al., 2003). 
Political organisations in the context of civil wars thus respond to a specific set of incentives and 
opportunities. The presence of protracted violence and the breakdown of the state’s monopoly on 
the use of force lead to specific forms of governance. Governance in the form of norms, 
expectations, and patterns of behaviour shape perceptions of what is politically possible and 
creates the context in which strategies are considered and adopted (Sindre & Söderström, 2016). 
Further to this, protracted civil wars require institutions with highly developed capacities and 
structures to mobilise supporters and provision armed forces. Civil wars may be initiated by 
grievance or frustration or greed but to become protracted and sustained for decades requires 
institutions that respond to the incentives and opportunities of violence, mobilise and coordinate 
large numbers of fighters and supporters, and overcome the collective action problem (Lyons, 
2016). Civil wars produce wartime governance and wartime institutions and this context in turn 
reinforces strategies of violence and political actors that are able to manage the risks and seize 
the opportunities of war (Sindre & Söderström, 2016).  
Following on from the above, as Sindre & Söderström (2016) comment, the challenge is to 
identify the factors that explain how ex-combatants decide to mobilise and organise and how, 
when in a position to govern, they decide to relate to their former members. Moving beyond a 
mere description of ex-combatants role in the governance of post-conflict societies, the 
relationship is not straightforward. As several studies show, demobilisation can be a complex 
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process, when a group has high expectations of what their sacrifice and subsequent contribution 
to peace either via a settlement or victory will bring in the forms of rewards, elevated status and 
economic compensation. What is clear from the growing literature in this field is that both the 
legacies of armed group mobilisation as well as the nature of conflict endings (settlement versus 
victory) impact the transition process – a number of factors that influence this transition are 
briefly explored below. 
Origins of the combatants 
The origins of political actors, often deeply affect their organisation, political culture, strategic 
behaviour and democratic capacity and participation in the (electoral) political game (Lyons, 
2016; 2016a; 2016b).  
Experience of administration 
Insurgent groups engaged in protracted civil war often have direct experience administering 
liberated territory (Lyons, 2016). In this way rebels, and particularly victorious rebels, have 
experience in performing functions of political administration. During civil war, military structures 
play roles that political parties are expected to play in peacetime. Victorious insurgent groups 
often carry these models and precedents of military governance into the post-war political arena 
(Wittig, 2016; Sindrea, 2016). The necessity to administer newly acquired territory provides 
incentives to develop cadres with skills to mobilise civilians under the difficult circumstances of 
violence and insecurity with the goal of supporting a military strategy. The institutions established 
by the insurgent organisations in liberated territory are designed in ways to facilitate recruitment, 
allow access to recruitment, and to monitor for the penetration of countervailing sources of 
authority (Arjona, 2014). In some cases, insurgent groups do more than control violence but seek 
to provide some level of public goods – what has been referred to by Arjona (2014) as a 
‘rebelocracy’. These precedents shape post-war governance as successful military 
administrators are converted (at least formally) into peacetime governors. 
Interdependency between elites, combatants and civilian support 
networks 
Wartime mobilisation can create strong and lasting ties of inter-dependency between leadership 
of the rebel group and ex-combatants and civilian support networks. Putting emphasis on the 
degree of institutionalisation, Sindre (2016) demonstrates the saliency of path dependency 
between wartime organisational structure and the degree and mode of inclusion of ex-
combatants in decision making post-conflict. Although organised according to strict hierarchical 
command structures, in matters concerning governance, midlevel regional commanders may 
retain a significant amount of autonomy. Such organisational trajectories have direct impact on 
leader–member relationships when rebel groups reorganise as governing power. 
As rebel groups transform in the post-conflict period, one might also expect a transformation of 
these incentives. Here, it is useful to relate the organisational and mobilisational legacies of the 
armed movement, in particular: 
 How were members mobilised and integrated into the group during war?  
 To what extent are the rebel group’s wartime organisational characteristics? 
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 Were the group’s mobilisational strategies an asset, or not?  
Analyses of rebel group mobilisation have highlighted the significance of mobilisational incentives 
that rebel groups rely on to build coherent organisations during war, distinguishing between 
selective, market-based incentives or ideational incentives (Weinstein 2007). 
In general, it is expected that groups that rely on ideology also have more loyal and committed 
supporters, while those that also depend on providing selective incentives, primarily material 
goods, need to continue to provide such provisions in order to retain their loyalty (Weinstein 
2007). The pressures of protracted conflict forge relationships based on interdependence if not 
trust among leaders and between leaders and the rank and file. How these interdependencies 
evolve over short-, medium- and long-term time frames is subject to much debate and influenced 
by contextual factors. 
Strength of networks of (former combatants) 
Another area of concern is the strength of networks of former combatants. Peacebuilding and 
reintegration policies often try to break such networks and disconnect individuals from each 
other. How important these networks are for the functioning of these groups in post-conflict 
settings requires further investigation e.g. in the case of Colombia (Söderström, 2016). 
Wartime legacies 
An important factor shaping the rebel-to-political transition of armed movements in post-conflict 
settings pertains to the political identity these groups develop in wartime. This political identity is 
itself a multi-dimensional concept shaped not only by the political ideology, practices and 
institutions established by the rebel organisation, but also by the relationship with the state and 
its political institutions. Far from functioning in a vacuum or isolated, rebel groups, especially 
when operating as alternative providers of governance, build multi-layered networks of relations 
with the state, the pre-existing traditional institutions of society as well as with other domestic and 
international political actors (Berti, 2016). 
The legacies of how insurgents organise themselves as proto-parties during the time of armed 
struggle shape how post-war parties and political order are structured. According to Lyons (2016) 
rebels that won after sustained conflicts fought in confined territories with experience in wartime 
administration of liberated territory transformed into strong authoritarian ruling parties. These 
transformations succeeded in ending the wars and creating stability but did little to advance 
democratisation. In Uganda, there was a period of ‘no-party’ democracy 1990s and in Ethiopia 
there were a series of non-competitive elections that resulted in the ruling party winning by 
majorities of over 90%. Each regarded dissent as illegitimate and used state power to repress 
local media and civil society (Lyons 2016).  
In other cases, insurgents that replaced incumbent regimes after very short wars fought over 
broad territory with significant help from external powers resulted in post-war parties that lacked 
coherent leadership or experience in governing e.g. Libya. These transformations succeeded in 
replacing brutal incumbents like Mobutu and Qaddafi but failed to sustain the peace or even 
consolidate control over the state’s territory. 
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Nature of war termination 
The existing literature on the links between different types of war termination and post-war 
politics has inconsistent findings:  
 Toft (2010) argues that civil wars that end in rebel victory are more inclined to produce 
democratic outcomes. This is because victorious insurgents have both the military 
capability to penalise spoilers and the incentives to govern justly in order to gain 
legitimacy from domestic constituencies and the international community. Toft (2010: 60) 
argues that a ‘victor’s peace’ will lead to stronger institutions which in turn lead to ‘a more 
stable, and perhaps more democratic, system of government.’  
 Fortna and Huang (2012), however, found little support in the quantitative data for the 
hypothesis that military victories – including insurgent victories – improve the prospects 
for democratisation. Lyons (2016) argues that the legacies of the war and dynamics of 
the war-to-peace process following rebel victory make authoritarian regimes more likely. 
 Söderberg Kovacs and Svenson (2012) also critique Tofts’ (2010) position commenting 
that conflict resolution represents a peaceful way of managing and resolving armed 
conflicts. This is in sharp contrast to war termination strategies aiming for military victory 
where the use of force is the main tool used to accomplish peace. Negotiated settlements 
are seen to lead to more stable and durable peace than military victories. 
Ideology versus material interests 
Another concern often raised about helping armed groups transform into political parties relates 
to their lack of politics (Sindre & Söderström, 2016). As many armed groups are seen to be 
driven by other things (material gain for example) than legitimate political claims and visions, 
concerns are raised about whether they will contribute with a serious political agenda when they 
enter electoral politics. Della Porta’s (2013) comparative work on clandestine political violence 
emphasises the specific nature of solidarity that arises from underground politics. Clandestine 
organisations tend to be particularly centralised, hierarchical, and compartmentalised and 
become more so as repression and violence escalate. A coterie of linked leaders and high levels 
of solidarity forged in wartime facilitate the transition from a rebel movement to a strong 
authoritarian political party. 
In general, it is expected that groups that rely on ideology also have more loyal and committed 
supporters, while those that also depend on providing selective incentives, primarily material 
goods, need to continue to provide such provisions in order to retain their loyalty (Weinstein 
2007). 
Initial legitimacy from victory  
Victorious rebels are more likely to derive legitimacy from defeating the old order and ending the 
violence. Rebels who fight to stalemate and accept negotiations can claim a role in forcing a 
transition, but those claims are more ambivalent and contingent than claims of unilateral victory. 
According to Lyons (2016b), war-weary publics often appreciate parties that can credibly promise 
security, and there is some survey evidence to show that exposure to protracted conflict leads a 
population to be more willing to accept authoritarian leaders 
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Power consolidation rather than power sharing  
Lyons (2016b) comments that in contrast to cases of negotiated settlements, vanquished 
incumbents are not likely to play important post-conflict roles in cases of insurgent victory. Rather 
than struggling with power-sharing or the integration of rebel forces into the national military, 
victorious insurgents can focus on consolidating and expanding their political power, 
incorporating new constituencies, and building upon their pre-existing wartime structures of 
command and control. 
3. Victorious rebels and post-war politics 
Lyons, T. (2016). Victorious rebels and postwar politics. Civil Wars. Volume 18. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2016.1205562  
This paper examines cases of rebel victories in civil wars in Africa and traces the links between 
war duration, the extent of external intervention, and whether or not the war was fought in a 
compact area with the nature of the post-war political parties. It argues that protracted wars in 
confined territory with little external assistance have different organisational legacies than quick 
wars fought over expansive territory with significant international involvement. This paper argues 
that there are two models of post-war politics following insurgent victory.  
 The first sees battle-hardened insurgents transform into strong, authoritarian parties that 
dominated post-war politics (e.g. Uganda and Ethiopia).  
 The second is characterised by international intervention that significantly undermined 
the incumbent and that saw ‘accidental victors’ struggle to consolidate power and 
overcome rivals (e.g. Libya). 
Lyons (2016) comments that in some cases, notably Uganda and Ethiopia, prolonged civil wars 
fought in relatively compact areas and without significant external involvement created rebels 
with strong, coherent leadership and experiences in administering liberated territory. These 
legacies then supported the transformation of the victorious insurgents into the strong 
authoritarian ruling parties. 
While strong coherent rebel movements are more likely to win civil wars, in a number of cases 
disorganised insurgent groups have replaced incumbent regimes, often with significant external 
assistance. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Libya, for example, short wars 
fought over large areas with significant international involvement resulted in weak, deeply divided 
insurgent movements that took control of the capital as the incumbent regime collapsed. These 
victorious rebels lacked the time and opportunity to build coherent leadership and experience in 
wartime administration. 
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Hybrid Political Orders 
Anten, L. et al. (2012).  The Political Economy of State-building in Situations of Fragility 
and Conflict: from Analysis to Strategy. Clingendael Institute. 
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20120100_cru_political_economy.pdf  
According to the authors of this paper, the concept of hybridity is useful in bringing to the surface 
two key elements of governance:  
 historically embedded disconnects between formal and informal institutions, and  
 geographical areas that have been historically outside of state control.  
In the DRC for example, the district of Ituri has been considered an ineffectual hybrid order, 
where large areas have consistently remained outside state control. The insecurity generated by 
violent conflict has led the population to rely on customary leaders for governance. The central 
state has supported recognition of those leaders through their position as collectivité chiefs. 
However, the informality characterising these sub-national entities has generated confusion, 
tensions and grey areas, with different ethnic groups contesting the boundaries of the chiefs’ 
jurisdiction. The powers of these chiefs have been challenged, as they do not always translate 
into effective government services.  
The authors continue that political hybridity assumes different connotations in the Guatemalan 
context. Here, it characterises the emergence of a new sort of state, in which intense 
transactions between officials, operating with private interests, and non-state parties, 
representing group interests, have become the dominant modus operandi. The lines between 
legitimate and criminal behaviour have been blurred, and the resulting ‘informal accumulation of 
power’ threatens efforts at state-building. 
Another example used is that of Pakistan where the remoteness of certain areas has led to the 
establishment of localised traditional forms of governance. The absence of state institutions and 
the established presence of parallel structures and mechanisms negotiating access to and 
control of power at the local level created the ideal conditions for the emergence of hybrid 
institutional contexts. In the above examples, non-state institutions have carved out an 
operational space that is considered legitimate and effective, if only because the state has been 
perceived as either repressive or an absconding entity. 
Another conclusion drawn from the examples above is that, where informal rules dominate 
governance, levels of institutionalisation are generally low, and people have little trust in formal 
institutions, in turn undermining the possibility of achieving political reform through institutional 
redesign.  
4. Case Studies 
Rwanda 
Lyons, T. (2016b). The Importance of Winning: Victorious Insurgent Groups and 
Authoritarian Politics. Comparative Politics. Vol. 48, No. 2. 





This article argues that legacies of war and the imperatives of war-to-peace transitions following 
victory explain how victorious insurgent movements become strong authoritarian parties. It uses 
this mechanism to trace the process of transition in the cases of Uganda, Ethiopia (Lyons’ views 
on these countries are presented in a following paper), and Rwanda. 
Victorious rebellion and post-war authoritarian order are linked by a mechanism that includes the 
legacies of the war and the distinct imperatives of power consolidation after victory. Rather than 
building the conditions for more democratic regimes, path dependency will lead victorious 
insurgents to act as they did during the war and seize opportunities during the war-to-peace 
transition to consolidate their power. The mechanism that links war termination by rebel victory to 
a post-war political system dominated by a strong authoritarian party therefore consists of two 
main components:  
 the legacies of the war that create path dependencies and; 
 the specific dynamics of transitions following victory that create opportunities for power 
consolidation. 
Lyons argues that four mechanisms link victorious rebels to strong authoritarian parties. Two link 
legacies of war with powerful military institutions' ability to re-create themselves as powerful 
political institutions.  
1) the levels of solidarity and leadership coherence characteristic of successful insurgent 
groups; and  
2) the precedents and organisational structures developed during wartime governance of 
liberated territory.  
The third and fourth are processes that are inherent to the war-to-peace transition following rebel 
victory. These are  
3) post-war legitimacy derived from military victory—"we rule because we won!"; and   
4) the use of transitional processes, such as post-conflict elections, transitional justice, and 
demobilisation, as instruments of power consolidation. 
The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) has governed since it expelled the génocidaires in 1994 with 
the RPF evolving into a post-insurgent party defined by its strength and authoritarian nature. It is 
a mass-mobilising party with deep penetration into the countryside, not a narrowly based military 
or personalistic regime. It has won a series of largely uncompetitive elections since seizing power 
and has used the power of incumbency to intimidate opposition and limit political space. Paul 
Kagame, served as both leader of the insurgent movements and as post-war leader of ruling 
party and head of state. 
Coherent leadership and solidarity: The RPF began with an already established set of 
seasoned military leaders who had fought together in Uganda. Rwigyema rose to deputy 
commander of the NRA before becoming commander of the RPA and Kagame served as head 
of military intelligence and was in the United States receiving training as an officer of the NRA 
when the civil war broke out 
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Wartime governance: The RPF planned and organised its invasion of Rwanda for three years 
prior to crossing the border and anticipated a protracted civil war similar to the one many of them 
had experienced in Uganda. The RPF occupied a liberated zone along Rwanda's border with 
Uganda but did not control significant territory until 1993. The Rwandans had significant wartime 
experience fighting within the NRA in Uganda. Kagame headed the NRA's military intelligence, 
providing him with valuable experience in maintaining discipline and detecting defection. Refugee 
camps and the large Rwandan population within the diaspora provided additional opportunities to 
develop skills and institutions to manage civilians in support of the military campaign. 
Post-conflict elections: A significant challenge faced by the RPF upon seizing power was that 
key national constituencies played little or no role in their respective insurgent movements. The 
civil wars had specific regional and ethnic concentrations, and many residents remained outside 
of the zones of violence. The winning rebels therefore needed to build institutional links to 
communities less directly involved in the armed struggle in order to govern as a national party. 
The Tutsi-dominated RPF initially reached out to "moderate Hutus" so that it could position itself 
as a national party. By creating state-wide political parties, rebel movements with specific 
regional and ethnic origins could create new institutions that could claim to represent the whole 
of the population. Post-conflict elections provided the context for such institutional transformation. 
Elections following rebel victory, therefore, have little to do with determining who will rule, but 
rather perform key functions in power consolidation and in the creation of strong authoritarian 
parties. These polls are typically non-competitive. 
Uganda, Ethiopia and Libya 
Lyons, T. (2016). Victorious rebels and postwar politics. Civil Wars. Volume 18. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2016.1205562  
Uganda 
The Ugandan Bush War, also known as the Luwero War, the Ugandan Civil War or the 
Resistance War, was a civil war fought in Uganda by the official Ugandan government and its 
armed wing, the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), against a number of rebel groups, 
most importantly the National Resistance Army (NRA), from 1980 to 1986. 
Lyons (2016) notes that the NRA organised the population in areas it controlled during the war 
through ‘Resistance Committees’ (RCs). The rebels ‘generally’ treated civilians in liberated 
territory well and the RCs were in some measure a form of village democracy reflecting local 
opinion and grievances. When military conditions contradicted local democracy, the NRA put 
military survival ahead of civilian protection. The RCs were a product of wartime conditions. 
The models developed by the NRA to administer liberated territory became the basis for the 
NRA’s local political structures after the war ended. When the NRA seized power in 1985, RCs 
were well established in western Uganda, where the rebels controlled territory, and were put in 
place elsewhere. 
Ethiopia 
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Ethiopian Civil War was a civil war in Ethiopia and Eritrea, fought between the Ethiopian military 
junta communist governments and Ethio-Eritrean anti-government rebels from September 1974 
to June 1991. 
In northern Ethiopia, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) saw itself as an army that would 
win by forging relationships with the people of Tigray. Following the Maoist model, the rebels 
deployed political cadres with its military units to insure discipline and organise regular self-
criticism sessions known as gimgema. The rebels created local councils known as baito 
(‘peoples’ council’) to administer liberated zones. The baito provided a mechanism for top-down 
wartime governance and served to implement the TPLF’s war policies.  
During the mid-1980s famine, the Front had the capacity and local legitimacy to organise a 
movement of the population from Tigray to TPLF-controlled camps in Sudan. The movement had 
its own humanitarian wing, the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) that coordinated relief operations 
with international assistance, and the Tigray Development Association that raised significant 
resources in the diaspora. The insurgents played other state-like diplomatic roles, including 
having extensive (and often contentious) relationships with neighbouring insurgents in Eritrea as 
well as a range of international actors and organisations. The TPLF overthrew the dictatorship of 
the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) and established a new government in 
1991 that ruled Ethiopia until it was ousted from power in the federal government in 2018. 
Libya 
The Second Libyan Civil War was a multi-sided civil war that lasted from 2014 to 2020 fought 
between different armed groups, mainly the House of Representatives and the Government of 
National Accord. 
In Libya, after NATO air support prevented the rapid defeat of the opposition, the country 
became divided into an opposition controlled east and areas around Tripoli that remained under 
Qaddafi’s control. Different armed actors seized control of different zones with no overarching 
political structure. Misrata’s revolutionary brigades became particularly influential after 
withstanding a siege and the Zintan Military Council created an effective armed force based on 
Bedouin groups from the South. This decentralised war lacked an overarching organisational 
structure and the rebels struggled to establish a functioning government. Crosscutting micro-
dynamics, local militias that controlled neighbourhoods, transnational Islamist networks and 
actors seeking to control key trade routes competed in a series of bloody, parochial conflicts. 
Burundi 
Wittig, K. (2016). Politics in the shadow of the gun: revisiting the literature on ‘Rebel-to-
Party Transformations’ through the case of Burundi, Civil Wars, 18:2. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2016.1205561  
The Burundian Civil War lasted from 1993 to 2005. The civil war was the result of longstanding 
ethnic divisions between the Hutu and the Tutsi ethnic groups. The conflict began following the 
first multi-party elections in the country since its independence from Belgium in 1962, and is seen 
as formally ending with the swearing-in of President Nkurunziza in 2005. 
Burundi was long cited as a ‘success story’ for international liberal peacebuilding efforts by 
policymakers, diplomats, and academics alike. However, the enthusiasm for the country’s post-
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accord transition has long neglected that National Council for the Defense of Democracy – 
Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) increasingly returns to authoritarian 
practices and violence as a political tool to ensure its political hegemony. Latent political 
violence, including between CNDD-FDD and National Forces of Liberation (FNL), has replaced 
open armed conflict, but frequently escalates, especially around election time. While CNDD-FDD 
has become Burundi’s current ruling party, FNL constitutes the major opposition force. Under 
CNDD-FDD’s regime, Burundi has seen a constant authoritarian shift, coming to a head during 
the 2015 electoral crisis. Factions of CNDD-FDD and FNL have continued to use political 
violence. 
East Timor and Aceh 
Sindrea, G. (2016). In whose interests? Former rebel parties and excombatant interest 
group mobilisation in Aceh and East Timor. Civil Wars. Volume 18. Issue 2. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2016.1205564  
Sindrea comments that an important factor shaping rebel-to-party transformations and post-
conflict party governance pertains to how these groups relate to their former rank and file. While 
drawing on veterans of the war provides a stable source of support and organisational stability 
for the former rebel parties, ex-combatants may also pose challenges to such parties as they 
expect continued political influence, material rewards and social recognition for their contribution 
to the armed group. By identifying ex-combatants as a distinct interest group this argues that 
party-ex-combatant interaction directly shapes intra-party dynamics as well as policy formulation. 
This article provides an exploration of Aceh and East Timor. The author notes that in both 
contexts, leaders of the liberation movements rose to political prominence in and are both 
challenged by former members of the armed movements. After having demobilised their troops, 
both the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the resistance movement in East Timor (Fretilin) have 
manifested themselves as major political parties since the conflicts ended, in 2005 and 2002, 
respectively. GAM’s party, the Aceh Party, remains the largest party in the regional assembly; it 
has held the governorship since 2006 and controls a majority of posts as mayors and district 
heads across the province. In East Timor, Fretilin is the largest political party in the national 
assembly, but has failed to build broad enough coalitions to form government. Here, former 
resistance members divide their loyalties between several additional parties and groups. 
Aceh 
The insurgency in Aceh, officially designated the Rebellion in Aceh by the Indonesian 
government, was a conflict fought by the GAM between 1976 and 2005, with the goal of making 
the province of Aceh independent from Indonesia. The aftermath of a strong military offensive in 
2003 and the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake brought a peace agreement and an end to the 
insurgency. 
In the case of GAM, a main challenge to the establishment of a political party was for the 
leadership, who had run the war from their exiled positions in Sweden, was the maintenance of 
organisational cohesiveness. Although formally GAM had in place a rather strict organisational 
hierarchy with powers divided between a government in exile, a political wing and a military wing 
(Tentara Nasional Aceh), on-the-ground authority was much more dispersed with special 
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authorities awarded to regional commanders. Especially below the district level, individual 
commanders retained a substantial amount of autonomy in day-to-day affairs, often in the areas 
of tax collection, illegal logging and smuggling, but also in terms of more informal governance 
provision and interaction with civilians. These organisational structures enabled proliferation of 
localised patronage structures that were geographically demarcated and in which lower level 
combatants were incentivised by elevated social status and (small) material rewards. When 
peace came, as the central leadership was in exile, regional commanders were those who rose 
to prominence within the movement. 
Hence, when a prominent elite divide occurred between different factions within GAM that also 
delayed the formal establishment of a GAM party, it was not over ideology or between supporters 
and opponents of the peace agreement. Rather, it was the manifestation of intra-group conflicts 
between regional rebel commanders who were worried about being side-lined from important 
spoils such as positions and peace dividends and the central leadership of the organisation that 
had lived in exile for the most part of the conflict. 
East Timor 
Fretilin proved unable to unify former resistance members and supporters to secure a coherent 
and unified party organisation. Instead, ex-combatant loyalties are divided amongst different 
factions of the resistance according to membership in the armed front (Falintil), the clandestine 
front, the Fretilin party or other leaders. Since it first mobilised for independence after the 
Indonesian occupation of East Timor in 1975, the resistance movement, Fretilin, evolved into a 
highly complex organisational structure. In contrast to the GAM leadership, who for the most part 
were unified in their ideological prescript for an independent Aceh, the East Timorese resistance 
had become increasingly fragmented over core issues such as the role of the armed wing and 
how to organise the resistance inside and outside of East Timor. The fragmentation into multiple 
fronts such as a split between Fretilin and its armed wing, Falintil; the formation of the National 
Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) by Falintil commander Xanana Gusmao; and the 
manifestation of highly autonomous urban clandestine movements have had direct influence on 
politics after independence. The fragmentation resulted in a lasting split between the founding 
leaders of the resistance movement. 
The reliance on ideational incentives to mobilise members did not bind the organisation together. 
Instead, it has served to create lasting internal splits. Against the backdrop of a fragmented 
political landscape, unclear prospects for former resistance members and weak and 
confrontational leadership, former combatants and resistance members sought to influence 
politics via extra-legal interest groups. The most prominent of these ex-combatant associations 
that were created after the fallout over the establishment of the armed forces was the Council for 
the Popular Defence of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (CPD-RDTL). The group 
mounted demonstrations against the Fretilin government, accusing the leadership of corruption 
and nepotism. Another group was the Sagrada Familia, led by former Falintil commander Elle 
Sete (alias L-7). Elle Sete had fallen out with several Falintil commanders including Xanana 
Gusmao. In April 2000, he had left the Falintil Aileu cantonment with some of his troops and their 
weapons to return to his birthplace in Baucau. Both groups drew their main support from 
disaffected ex-Falintil, but their membership base also included poor farmers and unemployed 
youth who had not been active during the war. The membership was concentrated in the 
birthplace of their leaders. 
   
 
15 
The fact that ex-combatant mobilisation became much more confrontational in East Timor than in 
Aceh in part confirms theoretical expectations that members who were mobilised by ideational 
incentives have less tolerance for political compromises of ideas and values. The outcome of 
sustained mobilisation by ex-combatant groups established outside and without the 
organisational vehicle of the former rebel party has defined the political discourse of political 
parties and actors in East Timor. 
Colombia 
Söderström, J. (2016). The resilient, the remobilized and the removed: party mobilization 
among former M19 combatants. Volume 18, Issue 2. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2016.1205565  
The 19th of April Movement, or M-19, was a Colombian guerrilla organisation movement. After its 
demobilisation it became a political party, the M-19 Democratic Alliance (Alianza Democrática M-
19), or AD/M-19. The M-19 traced its origins to the allegedly fraudulent presidential elections of 
19 April 1970. 
Using life history interviews with former combatants of the armed group M19 in Colombia, this 
article demonstrates what aspects of the party mobilise and stymie their political mobilisation. 
Through exploring three typical political life paths – the Resilient, the Remobilised and the 
Removed – this article demonstrates the long-term challenges of post-war politics, the role of the 
party, as well as the personal journey from (war and) peace to democracy. Söderström suggests 
this typology can be useful in other cases, for both describing the paths taken among other 
armed groups, and explaining such variation. 
This article examines how the new political party shaped the political mobilisation among 
individual ex-combatants, in the case of M19 in Colombia. Individual political mobilisation varied 
across the failed trajectory of M19 as a political party. The mobilisation of individual members is 
only partially dependent on the political reintegration of their armed group. Political mobilisation, 
while a dominant theme in their lives, was cyclical across their lifetime. The long-term 
perspective employed in this article is crucial to revealing these trends 
This article underscores how conflict identities in general can remain intact over long periods of 
time, which can lead to either protracted armed conflict or discordant party politics. Importantly, 
other arenas of politics were open to former M19 combatants – they could continue within M19 
ranks or move into other arenas of politics; in contexts where former combatants are shunned 
such reorientation is unlikely 
Overall, the interviewed were very involved in politics, and expressed a strong attachment to both 
the M19 group and to politics. The development of the party post-disarmament was not irrelevant 
in conditioning their form of participation and for some it was even pivotal. Importantly, the 
perception of the group’s agenda, and the leadership development within the party, as well as 
specific individuals’ role for mobilisation, were evident in the interviews. The group was also 
important to the degree that it offered patronage and supported the continuation of the network. 
For some, these factors caused them to move away from the party created in the wake of M19’s 
disarmament, and into other arenas of politics, for others these factors helped sustain their 
political engagement post-disarmament. For lower ranking combatants, the party and group was 
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the main vehicle for their political mobilisation, and thus the failure of the group had severe 
repercussions at the individual level.  
The centrality of the M19 identity to all the life paths explored in this study is striking. The legacy 
of experiencing armed combat within this group has shaped the political mobilisation of these 
individuals. For many the experience of armed combat and the political ideals developed during 
the conflict was a bigger determinant of their political mobilisation after disarmament than the 
trajectory of the party. Experiences of risk and nostalgia have also shaped the development of a 
political life post-disarmament and the continuation of their M19 identity. The experience of risk in 
the past created an ongoing cycle of having to justify past behaviour through continued political 
mobilisation. Feelings of nostalgia resonated more with those removed from politics post-
disarmament. The M19 identity and legacy were felt throughout their life, and formed the basis 
for many of their life choices, and political choices. It seems partisanship (or armed group 
membership) is largely a question of a social identity for the individual member, even if the party 
itself does not exist in its original form. Despite the failure of the group as a party, ideological 
attachment and group identity remain strong among former M19 combatants, long after the end 
of the armed conflict. For some, M19 has been a factor in their life for 40 years. Thus, this article 
underscores the importance of taking the creation of a social identity into account when trying to 
explain the role played by political parties in the lives of its members.  
Palestine and Lebanon 
Berti, B. (2016). Rebel politics and the state: between conflict and post-conflict, resistance 
and co-existence. Civil Wars, 18:2. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2016.1205560  
The study draws on the cases of Hamas and Hezbollah, looking at patterns of engagement with 
the state through their grassroots activism, institutional politics and governance. Despite their 
distinct political discourses, structures, political strategies and status; both the Palestinian Hamas 
and the Lebanese Hezbollah are simultaneously sophisticated armed groups; political parties; as 
well as social organisations involved in administering and delivering social services and 
autonomous provision of governance. They are paradigmatic cases to illustrate the multi-layered 
and hybrid relationship non-state actors can develop with the state and its political institutions. 
Liminality and in-betweenness define also their simultaneous investment in military, social and 
political activism whilst actively participating in conflict, in the process developing a political 
ideology, programme and discourse. The result of this investment is that both groups have over 
the years developed ad hoc political institutions, grassroots, institutional and governance 
activities and a self-standing political ideology. 
Palestine 
The Palestinian Hamas, or the ‘Islamic Resistance Movement’ (Harakat al Muqawama al-
Islamiyya), was established as the armed wing of the Gaza-branch of the Muslim Brotherhood at 
the outset of the First Intifada, in 1987. In the following decades, the group gradually evolved and 
expanded, going from being a relatively unsophisticated armed faction to becoming, especially in 
the past decade, the main militant group operating in the Palestinian arena. This evolution was 
mirrored by an even deeper political and social process of adaptation, with the group developing 
a political movement, a communication apparatus, an external armed wing and a political party. 
   
 
17 
This process was also accompanied by the group investing in maintaining and then expanding 
the social services network it inherited from the its predecessor, the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza 
and the social-charity institutions it had set up. 
Hamas is formally organised as a bureaucratic hierarchy topped by the Shura Council as its main 
decision-making body and followed by a diaspora-based executive organ, the Political Bureau, 
as well as by smaller regional Shura councils and local cells. Operating under this umbrella, the 
group developed a diverse and specialised organisational structure with a relatively 
geographically dispersed and decentralised leadership and with ad hoc institutions to administer 
social and political activities. Decentralisation also led to considerable autonomy to be held by 
the group’s political leaders. At the very minimum, Hamas has indeed four functionally 
distinguishable main centres of power: a political wing/party leadership located in Gaza; a military 
apparatus, also operating within the Strip; a diaspora-based political leadership; and, a social 
movement core. A West Bank-based leadership and a group of Hamas members held in Israeli 
custody can be added as additional subunits. As a result, Hamas’s non-military activities are 
carried out through ad hoc sub-organisational institutions with a relative level of local autonomy. 
Hamas became first involved in grassroots politics shortly after its establishment in the late 
1980s, consistently and directly taking part in elections in universities, work places and trade 
unions. The decision to create a parallel institutional political party to take part in electoral politics 
was first discussed in the mid-1990s, following the Oslo Accords, the creation of the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) in 1994 and leading up to the 1996 Palestinian legislative elections. In parallel to 
its political activism, Hamas also developed its autonomous social services network expanding it 
from the mid-to-late 1990s through a bottom-up, grassroots approach by becoming involved in 
charity work, development and poverty alleviation programmes and by establishing 
neighbourhood-based organisations, thereby providing local embryonic structures of self-
governance and community-based political representation. 
After gaining de facto control and becoming the sole political authority within the Gaza Strip; 
Hamas insisted on creating a de jure and de facto separation between the reformed security 
sector in Gaza, operating under the authority of the Hamas government, and the group’s armed 
wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. The policy of separation between institutional and 
insurgent forces reflected Hamas’s desire to preserve the armed wing’s operational autonomy 
and ‘outsider’ status. 
In Gaza, the Hamas-led government invested in strengthening coordination and control of 
Islamist social organisations, including those that previously held an indirect relationship with 
Hamas, as a tool to boost its governance records and effective control. Similarly, the Hamas 
government has at times relied on the Qassam Brigades to support internal security operations, 
both to crack down on crime as well as on political opposition. But while the cooperation between 
Hamas’s social apparatus its military wing and the political leadership ruling Gaza does occur; 
competition between the different centres of powers is not uncommon. For example, the parallel 
existence of the Qassam Brigades as an autonomous non-statutory armed group operating 
outside the realm of control of the Hamas government creates a de facto challenge to the 
government’s sole control and authority of the Strip; one where Hamas as a rebel ruler shares its 
monopoly on the use of force with Hamas as a resistance/insurgent force. 




In the case of Hezbollah, Berti identifies a similar formalisation of non-military institutions; albeit 
with lesser autonomy, stronger mechanisms for internal control and coordination and an overall 
stricter hierarchy. Since its formal creation in 1982, Hezbollah evolved into a highly formalised 
organisation, headed by the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council) and led by Secretary General 
Hassan Nasrallah. Under this centralised decision-making body, the organisation has an intricate 
structure, including a subordinate executive apparatus – made up of an executive council, an 
advisory organ (the politburo), parliamentary, judicial and jihad councils – as well as a military 
wing, a media and communication system, a political party and a complex governance, charity 
and welfare network. 
Hezbollah’s political practices are also rooted in the simultaneous grassroots and institutional 
politics approach. Initially created as an armed movement in the context of the Lebanese civil 
war and catalysed into action by the 1982 Israeli military operations in Lebanon; Hezbollah later 
evolved into a multifaceted socio-political and military organisation, becoming simultaneously 
involved in grassroots and institutional politics as well as in delivering social services through an 
alternative welfare network. . Following the end of the Lebanese civil war and the ratification of 
the Taif Accord (1989) Hezbollah chose to embrace institutional politics and compete in the 1992 
parliamentary elections. This decision was the result of a number of factors including the post-
civil war shift of the political confrontation from the battlefield to the political arena, the desire to 
convert the supporters acquired through the group’s ‘resistance’ against Israel into a political 
constituency and the beginning of Syria’s ‘tutelage’ over Lebanon. Syrian military occupation and 
political dominance over Lebanon between 1989 and 2005 offered Hezbollah the possibility of 
joining a friendly political system, i.e., one in which Damascus directly ensured that Hezbollah 
would be able to participate in institutional politics without having to relinquish its military 
apparatus. Since 1992, Hezbollah – much like Hamas – also acquired a parallel role of ‘insider 
institutional actor’ and ‘outsider resistance movement’. 
After the 2005 Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, Hezbollah’s political activism further increased 
with the group agreeing to join the executive cabinet and assuming ministerial posts within the 
Lebanese political system. Yet, integration into the political system did not mean having to 
relinquish its extensive social services network, nor having to do without a parallel and 
independent armed-political movement, whose strategy and military actions were not under the 
formal or informal control of the Lebanese state. 
In the case of Hezbollah, the group’s relationship with the state varies from conflict, to 
competition, to cooperation and shared governance. As a military organisation, Hezbollah’s 
autonomous armed wing does challenge in a fundamental way the state’s monopoly on the use 
of force; yet the relationship between the group and the Lebanese Armed Forces should not be 
seen as necessarily antagonistic. Rather, there is a de facto compartmentalisation of roles; with 
occasional cooperation – as was the case with the coordinated operations against jihadist rebel 
factions, in 2007, or more recently along the Syrian–Lebanese border since 2014. As 
administrator of a widespread social services network and an autonomous provider of 
governance, Hezbollah’s relationship with the state is similarly multi-layered. On the one hand, 
Hezbollah has established a sophisticated and comprehensive social services network in Shiite-
majority areas within Lebanon – from Beirut’s southern neighbourhoods and suburbs to the 
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Beqaa Valley, to the south of the country – where the state had historically been conspicuous by 
its absence. 
Mozambique and Angola 
Leão, A. (2007). Different opportunities, different outcomes – Civil war and rebel groups in 
Angola and Mozambique. Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik. 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/71734602.pdf  
The author of this papers notes that Angola and Mozambique share a common colonial history 
that determined the nature of their independence: the lack of political space in Portuguese 
politics precluded a political solution for independence, which led to armed struggle. Both 
countries exchanged a single-party regime with a centralised economic policy for multi-party 
democracy and a market-led economy. Both movements were founded in the context of the Cold 
War geography on the basis of ethnic, social and economic grievances.  
It is unlikely, however, that either could have progressed without the opportunities presented by 
the support they received from external actors; external pressure and interference was 
paramount in the way they developed, in the legitimacy they enjoyed or lacked and in the choices 
open to them. While UNITA (Angola) began with a clear political agenda, RENAMO’s 
(Mozambique) initial agenda was entirely military. UNITA progressed from political party to 
warlordism; RENAMO developed from a warlord movement to a political opposition. 
The natural endowment of each country was to play an important role in the decision-making 
processes of the two movements. Both UNITA and RENAMO pursued various strategies in the 
search for financial assistance and political legitimacy. For RENAMO’s fighters the immediate 
gains from peace in the form of two years’ salary proved to be more advantageous than a return 
to a foreseeably protracted conflict. UNITA’s diamond wealth precluded any immediate gains 
from a peace agreement or any pledge the international community might make: the movement 
had more to gain from the conflict. Once that wealth started to dwindle, UNITA began to falter. 
Grievances alone were not able to sustain the continuing war. While RENAMO fighters had a 
vested interest in the Mozambican peace settlement, since it entailed a material gain for each of 
them, UNITA fighters benefited from the revenue generated by diamonds, which exceeded 
anything a peace agreement might bring. Once that revenue declined, UNITA suffered mass 
desertions, even though its leader continued to be committed to war. 
It is none the less the natural endowments of the two countries that seem to have determined the 
leverage of the international community in the peace processes. Mozambique was and remains 
dependent on external aid. This enabled the international community to put pressure on its 
government, but also bound the international community to its commitments and gave donors a 
vested interest in the successful outcome of the peace process. Angola achieved peace by 
means of a perceived military victory, and the international community was not involved in the 
peace process. The leverage Angola enjoyed as a result of its mineral wealth reduced the 
leverage which the international community might otherwise have had, and international vested 
interests in Angola are eminently economic rather than humanitarian. 
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